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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
FUENTES V. STATE: A MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS IS NOT
REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THAT AN INDIVIDUAL IS
MENTALLY DEFECTIVE; REFERENCING AN INTERVIEW
THAT WAS NOT ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE AT CLOSING
DID NOT AMOUNT
TO A REVERSIBLE
ERROR;
EMPLOYMENT RECORDS WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED
FROM EVIDENCE.
By: Matthew Braun
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that evidence of a medical
diagnosis is not required to establish that a victim suffers from a mental
disability as defined under Section 3-301 of the Maryland Criminal Law
Code Annotated ("section 3-301"). Fuentes v. State, 454 Md. 296, 326, 164
A.3d 265, 283 (2017). The court also held that, although the prosecutor
acted improperly during closing remarks by referencing an interview that
was not admitted into evidence, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt and thus not a reversible error. Id. at 327, 164 A.3d at 283. Lastly, the
court held that the trial court properly excluded over 300 pages of
employment records on relevancy grounds. Id.
Miguel Fuentes ("Fuentes") and Ms. R. were employed at a Marriott
Hotel in Prince George's County and worked together for approximately 14
years. In February of 2012, Fuentes had vaginal intercourse with Ms. R. in a
closet at their place of employment. Ms. R. testified, using two dolls to
communicate, that Fuentes approached her from behind, put his hand over
her mouth and unzipped her pants. Ms. R. then became pregnant with a
daughter and a DNA test determined that Fuentes was the father. At trial, the
jury heard a wide variety of lay testimony corroborating Ms. R.'s disability.
This included testimony about her inability to perform daily tasks by herself,
such as cooking or getting to work. Additionally, Ms. R.'s case manager/job
coach testified that, due to her multiple disabilities, Ms. R. was incapable of
expressing herself.
Fuentes was convicted by jury in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County of second-degree rape and third-degree sexual offense and was
sentenced to twenty years in prison, with all but twelve years suspended.
Fuentes moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence which the
trial court denied. Fuentes filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court in an unreported
opinion. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari.
Three issues were presented to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Fuentes, 454 Md. at 302, 164 A.3d at 269. The first issue was whether the
evidence was legally insufficient, since the State failed to present a medical
diagnosis confirming Ms. R.'s mental disorder. Id. Second, the court
analyzed the prosecutor's closing statement to determine if informing the
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jury that Fuentes admitted to taking advantage of Ms. R. in an interview, not
admitted into evidence, was a reversible error. Id. Finally, the court looked
at whether the trial court erred by excluding Ms. R.'s employment records,
since the victim's ability to communicate and understand another's conduct
was fundamental in the jury's determination of her mental competency. Id.
The court began its analysis by discussing the elements required for a
successful conviction of second-degree rape under Section 3-304(a)(2) of the
Maryland Criminal Law Code Annotated ("section 3-304(a)(2)") and for
third-degree sex offense under Section 3-307(a)(2) of the Maryland Criminal
Law Code Annotated ("section "3-307(a)(2)"). Fuentes, 454 Md. at 310, 164
A.3d at 273. Both crimes required the State to prove that Fuentes engaged in
sexual contact or had vaginal intercourse with Ms. R., that Ms. R. was either
mentally defective, incapacitated, or physically helpless rendering her
incapable of consenting, and finally, that Fuentes knew, or should have
reasonably known, that Ms. R. was either mentally defective, incapacitated,
or physically helpless. Id. at 310, 164 A.3d at 273-74. It was undisputed
that Fuentes had both sexual contact and vaginal intercourse with Ms. R. Id.
at 311, 164 A.3d at 274. Therefore, the question became whether the
evidence presented was sufficient to establish that Ms. R. was mentally
defective and, if so, whether Fuentes knew, or reasonably should have
known, about her mental disability. Id.
Fuentes contended that because the terms "mental disorder" and "mental
retardation" are medical diagnoses, the State was required to establish this
through a medical professional. Fuentes, 454 Md. at 311, 164 A.3d at 274.
Because the State failed to establish that Ms. R. was diagnosed with a mental
disorder, Fuentes argued that no rational juror could find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that she suffered from a mental disorder rendering her
incapable of consent. Id. at 307, 164 A.3d at 271. The Court of Appeals
disagreed and held that, under section 3-301(b), evidence of a medical
diagnosis is not required to establish that an individual is mentally defective.
Id. at 314, 164 A.3d at 275.
The court reasoned that the jury was able to watch and observe testimony
from Ms. R., her mother, sister, and case manager/job coach. Fuentes, 454
Md. at 314-15, 164 A.3d at 276. Therefore, the jury was capable of
concluding that Ms. R. was suffering from a mental disability and was a
member of the vulnerable class of individuals that the statutes were designed
to protect. Id. The court further stated that the jury reasonably inferred that
Fuentes knew, or reasonably should have known, of Ms. R.'s disability from
their fourteen-year work relationship. Id.
Next, the court used the harmless error analysis to determine whether the
prosecutor's improper remarks at closing, referencing an interview that had
not been admitted into evidence, were prejudicial to Fuentes and thus a
reversible error. Fuentes, 454 Md. at 321, 164 A.3d at 280. In the interview,
Fuentes allegedly admitted to taking advantage of Ms. R.'s diminished
mental capacity. Id. at 315, 164 A.3d at 276. In weighing the totality of the
evidence against Fuentes, the court found that it was undisputed that he had
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engaged in vaginal intercourse with Ms. R. and that he knew, or should have
known, that she suffered from a mental defect. Id. at 321-22, 164 A.3d at
280. Next, the court looked at the severity of the prosecutor's comments and
found that the while the comments were improper, they did not require
reversal. Id. at 323, 164 A.3d at 281. In coming to this conclusion, the
Court of Appeals considered what remedial measures the trial court used to
cure any potential injustice. Id. at 322, 164 A.3d at 280. It noted that the
trial court had instructed the jury to rely solely on their own memories of the
testimony. Id. Therefore, the court ultimately determined that the State's
comments did not influence the verdict. Id. at 323, 164 A.3d at 281.
Finally, the court decided that the trial court properly excluded Ms. R.'s
employment records from evidence because they were not relevant. Fuentes,
454 Md. at 326, 164 A.3d at 283. The employment records contained
performance evaluations, which Fuentes argued contradicted the State's
claim that Mr. R. suffered from a mental defect. Id. at 324, 164 A.3d at 281.
Under de novo review, the court found that Ms. R.'s ability to perform
different housekeeping tasks was irrelevant when determining if her mental
defect rendered her legally incapable of consenting to sexual activity. Id. at
325-26, 164 A.3d at 282-83.
Therefore, the court rejected Fuentes'
arguments and upheld his conviction. Id. at 326-27, 164 A.3d at 283.
In Fuentes, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a medical
diagnosis is not necessary to successfully convict an individual of seconddegree rape or third-degree sex offense. It further held that the prosecutor's
statements at closing did not prejudice Fuentes and thus was not a reversible
error. Finally, the court found that Ms. R.'s employment records were
irrelevant in determining whether her mental disability prohibited her from
consenting to the sexual activity.
Maryland practitioners should be aware that this ruling demonstrates the
court's desire to maintain legislative safeguards protecting individuals
suffering from a mental disability. The court reinforces the statutory shield
designed to protect this vulnerable class of individuals by refusing to raise
the threshold of evidence required to convict someone of certain sexual
offenses. However, practitioners should also be mindful of the door the
court leaves open for potentially unfair prosecutions in the future. By not
requiring a medical diagnosis to establish a party's mental condition and
excluding employment records as evidence, the court makes clear its intent
to maintain the low level of evidence required to convict an individual of
these crimes.

